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The Arkansas Supreme Court v.
Landmen Title Examiners:
Recent Oil & Gas Decisions

J. H. Evans, Attorney at Law
P. 0 . Box 1872
Fort Smith, Arkansas 72902

The Arkansas Supreme Court vs. Landmen and Title Attorneys
I.

INTRODUCTION:
A.

The increased drilling activity of the past ten or
fifteen years has resulted in increased litigation over
mineral ownership.

B.

Rules which establish mineral ownership with reasonable
certainty a desirable goal.

C.

A look at some Arkansas Supreme Court decisions
concerning mineral ownership.

("Minerals" as used in

this discussion includes oil and gas).
1.

A brief look at the Strockhacker cases creating
uncertainty as to whether the word "mineral"
includes oil and gas.

2.

A discussion of more recent decisions, some of
which create uncertainties of mineral ownership
for landmen and title attorneys.

3.

All oil and gas title attorneys I know are
extremely unhappy with some of these recent
decisions, and believe the Arkansas Supreme Court
has made some bad precedents.

D.

Most mineral ownership title problems arise from
severed mineral interests.
1.

Adverse possession of the surface constitutes
adverse possession of the unsevered minerals, but
not as to severed mineral interests.
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2.

Title to severed minerals can only be acquired by
adverse possession through continuous production
and removal of the minerals for the statutory
period of seven years.

II.

A LOOK AT THE STROHACKER CASES:
A.

Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. Strohacker. 202
Ark. 645, 152 S.W.2d 557 (1941). In 1892 and 1893 the
Railroad, being the fee simple owner of certain land in
Miller County, Arkansas, executed and delivered deeds
thereto reserving "all coal and mineral deposits".
Strohacker owned these lands except for whatever
interest had been reserved by the Railroad. Strohacker
filed suit in the Miller County Chancery Court against
the Railroad to quiet title in him to the oil and gas.
His claim was that the parties to the deeds did not
intend to include oil and gas by reserving "all coal
and mineral deposits". The Trial Court held for
Strohacker and the Railroad appealed.
The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the lower court
decision, stating that the question to be answered was
what the Railroad meant when it reserved "all coal and
mineral deposits". The Court went on to say, in
essence, that in 1892 and 1893 in Miller County oil and
gas were not commonly recognized as minerals, and
therefore the Railroad could not have intended to
reserve same.

B.

Stegall v. Bugh . 228 Ark. 632, 310 S.W.2d 251 (1958).
On November 6, 1900, B. H. Stegall, the then owner of
the fee simple title to 120 acres in Union County,
Arkansas, executed a warranty deed to this land to M.
F. Goodwin which stated "except the mineral interest in
said lands". The appellant, J. H. Stegall was the
owner of all rights reserved by B. H. Stegall, and the
appellee, Mrs. E. E. Bugh, was the owner of all
interest not owned by J. H. Stegall. The trial judge
held that the words "mineral interest" did not include
oil and gas and entered an order quieting title to the
oil and gas in Mrs. E. E. Bugh. Stegall appealed.
The Arkansas Supreme Court stated that although there
was testimony that B. H. Stegall intended to reserve
the oil and gas, and he thought the words "mineral
interest" included oil and gas, that his intention was
not the controlling factor. In this connection the
Court stated:
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"We think that the meaning which this court has
heretofore and should hereafer give to the word
'mineral' in connection with its use in situations
similar to those of this case, is governed not by
what the grantor meant or might have meant, but by
the general legal or commercial usage of the word
at the time and place of its usage. The testimony
in the case under consideration justified the
trial court, we think, in finding that the word
'mineral', in its accepted legal and commercial
usage, did not include oil and gas in Union County
in 1900. This testimony was to the effect that
there was no oil production in Union County until
about 20 years after the deed in question was
executed and that the word 'minerals', as commonly
used in South Arkansas and Union County in 1900
would not have included oil and gas."
Based on the foregoing the Arkansas Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's decision.
C.

Ahne v. Reinhart & Donovan Company. 240 Ark. 691, 401
S.W.2d 565 (1966). On July 26, 1905, George Heim,
being the owner of the fee simple title, executed and
delivered a deed to Arkansas Anthracite Coal Company
conveying "all of the coal, oil and mineral" to certain
land in Logan County, Arkansas. Ahne was the successor
to the fee title of George Heim subject to the rights
conveyed by the mineral deed to Arkansas Anthracite
Coal Company, and the Reinhart & Donovan Company was
the successor in title to the rights conveyed by the
Heim deed.
The trial court held that the facts showed that gas was
a commonly recognized mineral in Logan County in 1905,
and that Reinhart and Donovan Company was therefore the
owner of all gas under the land involved. Ahne
appealed. In its opinion the Arkansas Supreme Court
reviewed some of the pertinent facts from the evidence
introduced during the trial, which are summarized as
follows:
1.

A gas field called the Mansfield Field was
discovered in Scott and Sebastian Counties in
1902.

2.

Most professional landmen in the Arkansas Valley
of Northern Arkansas agreed that the word
"mineral" included gas after 1900.
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3.

In Logan County in 1901 Choctaw Oil Company
obtained oil and gas leases on a sizable block of
acreage and drilled wells pursuant to these
leases.

4.

1900 was the earliest year in which there was
evidence of the growing realization of petroleum
as an economic mineral along the Arkansas River.

5.

As early as 1901 oil and gas were commonly
recognized minerals in Logan County.

Based upon the foregoing the Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court's decision.
D.

Uncertainty created by these decisions.
1.

They were based upon factual issues on a county by
county basis. For example, how early were oil and
gas commonly recognized as minerals in other
counties, such as Franklin, Johnson and Pope?

2.

Justice McFaddin dissented from the majority
opinions in the Ahne v. Reinhart & Donovan Company
case.

He agreed that oil and gas were generally

recognized as minerals in 1905 and concurred with
the majority in affirming the trial court's
decision.

His dissent was based upon the

reasoning of the other Justices because they were
proceeding on a county by county basis.

He

advocated making the decision uniform for the
entire State so that all uncertainty would be
erased, and stated he was convinced that oil and
gas were commonly recognized as minerals in the
entire State as early as January 1, 1900.

He went

on to say that "I wish this Court would so state
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and put an end to this 'drifting like a ship
without a rudder' course that we are pursuing on
this question which is vital to property".
3.

In recent years the Trial judges in counties along
the Arkansas River Valley, upon sufficient proof
being made, seem to have more or less adopted
Justice McFaddin's view, and have held oil and gas
were minerals as early as 1903.

III. THE DUHIG RULE:
A.

Its name is derived from the Texas Supreme Court case
of Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Company. 135 Tex. 503,
144 S.W.2d 878 (1940). Duhig owned the surface and
one-half of the minerals and executed a warranty deed
to the predecessor in interest of Peavy-Moore. The
deed warranted title to the described land but stated
"it is expressly agreed and stipulated that the grantor
herein retains an undivided one-half interest in and to
all mineral rights or minerals of whatever description
in the land." Duhig and Peavy-Moore each claimed
ownership of the one-half mineral interest.
The majority opinion of the Texas Supreme Court held
that the 1/2 interest was owned by Peavy-Moore. Their
reasoning was based on a two step approach. First the
granting clause operates and Peavy-Moore receives the
surface and one-half of the minerals. Next, the
reservation operates to return the one-half interest to
Duhig, leaving Peavy-Moore with the surface only. At
this point both the grant and the reservation have been
given effect, but this leaves Duhig in breach of his
warranty of conveying a 1/2 mineral interest. To cure
the breach of warranty the 1/2 mineral interest is
transferred from Duhig to Peavy-Moore.

B.

The Duhig rule was not applied in Opaline King Hill v.
Gilliam. 284 Ark. 383, 682 S.W.2d 737 (1985). In 1947
S. E. Gilliam owned the surface and 1/2 interest in the
minerals to certain land, and he executed a quitclaim
deed to same to Jefferson Phillips, but Gilliam
reserved a 1/2 interest in the oil, gas and minerals.
The heirs of Gilliam and the heirs of Phillips each
claimed this 1/2 mineral interest. The trial court
held the 1/2 interest was reserved by Gilliam in the
quitclaim deed and was owned by the Gilliam heirs.
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Upon appeal the Phillips heirs argued that applying the
rule in the Duhig case should result in the interest
being awarded to them. However, the Arkansas Supreme
Court rejected this argument and affirmed the trial
court's decision. The Court stated that Gilliam
warranted nothing by his quitclaim deed and that the
Duhig case did not apply. Thus, the reservation was
effective to reserve the 1/2 mineral interest owned by
Gilliam.
C.

A few months after the Hill v. Gilliam decision the
Arkansas Supreme Court decided the case of Peterson v.
Simpson. 286 Ark. 177, 690 S.W.2d 720 (1985). In 1948
Pope owned the surface and 1/2 minerals to certain land
and conveyed by warranty deed to Andrews, but Pope
reserved 1/2 of the minerals. Andrews conveyed all his
interest to Price, who conveyed to Brown, who conveyed
to Neal, who conveyed to Pearson, who conveyed to the
Simpsons. The Petersons are the successors in interest
to Pope and claimed this 1/2 mineral interest, and they
brought suit against the Simpsons to quiet title to
this 1/2 mineral interest. The trial court held this
1/2 mineral interest was owned by the Simpsons and the
Petersons appealed. The Arkansas Supreme Court
affirmed.
The Supreme Court discussed the Duhig case at some
length and stated that it is to be applied to cases
which do not involve the original grantor and his
immediate grantee. In this connection the Court
stated:
"As set forth previously in describing the chain
of title, the plaintiffs' predecessor in interest,
Pope, did not convey directly to the defendants.
In fact, there were four intervening conveyances
between the Pope deed and the Simpson deed. To
decide the issue now on the basis of what Pope
subjectively thought, or intended, when he
conveyed to Andrews in 1948, when neither the
grantees, nor their title examiners, were privy to
that thought, would be greatly unfair. Therefore,
the proper procedure to follow in cases which do
not involve the original grantor and his immediate
grantee, as here, is to arrive at the meaning of
the deed according to rules of objective construction, which we now hold to include
application of the Duhig rule. Subjective
considerations are not appropriate in such cases.
Accordingly, with respect to such reservations
contained in warranty deeds, a subsequent grantee
is to receive that percentage of mineral interest
in the land not reserved to the grantor, since the
deed purports to deal with 100% of the minerals.
6

If both the grant and the reservation cannot
thereby be given effect, the reservation must fail
and the risk of title loss is on the grantor."
"Subsequent purchasers, or grantees, must be able
to rely upon this interpretation or else, under
these type of circumstances, every title would
require a lawsuit in order to be alienable.
Rejection of the Duhig rule would mean sacrificing
the degree of certainty and guidance that it can
provide concerning marketability of mineral
interests, and replacing it with an outbreak of
lawsuits. This we are not willing to do."
"Our decision in this case does not change the
general rule that subjective considerations may be
taken into account in reformation cases involving
the original grantor and his immediate grantee."
D.

IV.

Three Justices dissented in the Peterson v. Simpson
case. They stated the reservation should be given
effect since subsequent grantees had constructive
notice that the grantor only owned a 1/2 mineral
interest.

EFFECT OF UNRECORDED MINERAL DEED ON TITLE OF SUBSEQUENT
OWNERS:
A.

Bona fide purchaser for value without notice.

B.

Title acquired by adverse possession and the subsequent
grantees in the chain of title.
1.

Taylor v. Scott, 285 Ark. 102, 685 S.W.2d 160
(1985) held that a deed effectively severed 1/2 of
the minerals when executed even though not
recorded for 18 years, during which time an
adverse possessor and his subsequent grantees in
the chain of title were in possession under a
claim of ownership.
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2.

The author of this opinion refuted the argument
that the decision would create uncertainty in the
oil and gas industry by stating:
"When a lawyer examines an abstract of title
and finds that the apparent owner's title
rests only on adverse possession, a rare
situation [emphasis supplied], he is at once
on notice that there may be flaws in the
title, such as the interest of a minor or
insane heir of a deceased holder of the
record title."

3.

As a matter of fact the rare situation is when
there is a perfect record title.

Thus, contrary

to the author's statement, adverse possession is
relied upon for title almost 100% of the time.
4.

This decision makes it impossible to cure this
defect with any certainty.

5.

In Phelps v . Justiss Oil Company. 291 Ark. 538,
726 S.W.2d 662 (1987), the Court held that one who
purchases from a grantor who does not have
apparently a perfect record title is not a bona
fide purchaser for value without notice, and cited
the Taylor v. Scott case in support thereof.

V.

SHOULD THE LACHES OR ESTOPPEL DOCTRINES BE APPLIED TO
PERSONS WHO FAIL TO RECORD MINERAL DEEDS FOR PROLONGED
PERIODS OF TIME?
A.

In some cases the Arkansas Supreme Court has adopted
the position that because of the fluctuating and
uncertain values of oil and gas lands, parties
asserting title thereto must act more promptly than in
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ordinary cases.

Pope v. Pennzoil Producing Company.

288 Ark. 10 (1986); Jackson v. Braden, 290 Ark. 117
(1986).
B.

Should persons be required to record mineral deeds
within a reasonable period of time in order to promote
certainty of title?

VI.

OTHER RECENT CASES OF INTEREST:
A.

Wallace v. Missouri Improvement Company, 294 Ark. 99,
740 S.W.2d 920 (1987). The tract of land involved was
condemned by the United States in 1942 for use as a
military base known as Fort Chaffee. Under the
Declaration of Taking the United States condemned the
fee simple title and deposited the estimated just
compensation. At the time the minerals were owned by
Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, the predecessor in
title to Missouri Improvement Company. The Railroad
was never made a party defendant nor notified of the
condemnation proceedings. In 1948 the United States
quitclaimed its interest in the tract to Wallace's
predecessor in title. Wallace claimed ownership of the
minerals because the United States had acquired the
full fee simple title in the condemnation action. The
trial court held the minerals were owned by Missouri
Improvement Company, and upon appeal this decision was
affirmed.
The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the basic
constitutional requirements of notice and a reasonable
opportunity to be heard were not met, and therefore the
United States did not acquire the minerals owned by the
Railroad. The Court relied on the fact that at the
time of the condemnation the minerals were assessed in
the same tax book (not sub-joined), and that a
reasonable search would have revealed the mineral
ownership of the Railroad.
This decision is directly contrary to the decision in
the case of United States of America v. Herring. 750
F.2d 669 (1984).

B.

Haynes V. Metcalf, 297 Ark. 40, 759 S.W.2d 542 (1988).
The fee title to the tract of land involved was vested
in V. F. Metcalf alone and in 1969 him and his wife,
Oma Metcalf, the appellee, executed a deed to Verna
Haynes, the appellant, which contained a reservation by
the grantors of the royalties and mineral rights so
long as either of the grantors lived. V. F. Metcalf
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died in 1984 and this litigation involved who should
receive the royalties from producing wells.
The Arkansas Supreme Court acknowledged the general
rule that an exception or reservation in favor of a
stranger to a deed is void except to confirm a right
which the stranger already had. Cases from other
jurisdictions were cited which held that there is an
exception to this rule when there is a reservation of a
life estate in favor of the spouse of the grantor.
However, the Court stated it was not necessary to
decide whether Arkansas would follow this exception.
Instead, the Court held that Haynes was in possession
of the deed from 1969 until 1986, when this lawsuit was
commenced, and made no objection to the reservation,
and she was therefore estopped from changing the terms
thereof.
VII. RECENT DECISIONS CONSTRUING WHETHER DEEDS TO RAILROADS
CONVEYED THE FEE TITLE OR ONLY A RIGHT OF WAY:
A.

Coleman v . Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 294 Ark.
633, 745 S.W.2d 622 (1988). Three deeds were involved.
One conveyed "a strip of land one hundred feet wide."
Another conveyed "a strip of land 100 feet wide for
right of way also an additional strip of land 250 feet
wide extending lying on the south side of said right of
way and adjacent thereto . . . .” The third deed
conveyed "a strip of land 100 feet wide for right of
way . . . also extra for depot grounds a strip of land
250 feet wide lying south of and adjoining said right
of way.”
The trial court held these deeds conveyed the fee
simple title, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed.

B.

Wylie v. Tull, 298 Ark. 511, 769 S.W.2d 409 (1989).
Approximately 50 deeds were involved. A few were
headed "Warranty Deed" but conveyed either a strip 100
feet wide or a strip 200 feet wide "for right of way."
The rest were titled "Right of Way Deed" and conveyed a
strip 100 feet wide with the right of borrow earth of
said "right of way." Dower was relinquished in most.
The trial court held these deeds conveyed only rights
of way, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed.

C.

Brewer & Taylor Company v. Wall, 299 Ark. 18, 769
S.W.2d 753 (1989). Seven deeds were involved. All
were headed "Right of Way and Release of Damages" and
stated "hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto the
Choctaw & Memphis Railroad Company, and unto its
successors and assigns forever, a strip of land one
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hundred feet in width for a right of way."
relinquished in all but one of the deeds.

Dower was

The trial court held these deeds conveyed only rights
of way, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed.
D.

These cases follow the general rule that when
construing deeds the primary concern is to ascertain
the intention of the parties, and that the deeds will
be examined from their four corners for the purpose of
ascertaining that intent from the language employed.
In this connection the Brewer & Taylor Company v. Wall
case stated that the following factors are indications
of the intent to convey an easement or right of way:
1.

The deed specifies that the land conveyed is for a
right of way.

2.

Only nominal consideration is stated.

3.

The shape of the tract makes other uses unlikely.

4.

The railroad is given the specific right to take
stone, gravel, timber and earth from the strip
itself.

The Brewer & Taylor Company v. Wall case stated that
the following factors are indications of the intent to
convey a fee simple interest:
1.

The right of increasing the width of the strip of
land for necessary slopes, embankments, turnouts
and with the right of changing water courses, and
of taking a supply of water and of borrowing or
wasting earth, stone or gravel outside the strip.

2.

The conveyance of additional land besides the
strip.

3.

The relinquishment of dower rights.

VIII. CONCLUSION:
A.

The Supreme Court, although giving lip service to the
desirability of certainty in titles, has failed to
apply same in some of its decisions.

B.

It seems the Court decides some cases based upon its
view of equity in the particular situation without
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regard to the precedent, or lack of precedent, being
set.
C.

The name of the game seems to be hooray for the person
who does not record his mineral deed for many, many
years, and to hell with persons who have in good faith
relied upon no such deed being of record during those
many years.

D.

It is difficult to predict with any degree of accuracy
what the courts are liable to do in situations where
the facts vary at all from those of previous decisions.
Therefore, the only logical solution is to take
protective leases.
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